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THE ETHIOPIAN INTELLIGENTSIA 
AND THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR 1935-1941 
By Bahru Zewde 
The Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-1941 could be said to have brought about the 
denouement of the Ethiopian intellectuals who had argued and worked for reform in the 
decades before the war. One could of course contend that Hayla-Sellase's 
consolidation of power after 1930 had diminished their margin of operation 
considerably, and that they were ultimately doomed to be absorbed in the emerging 
power structure. But that would have been a lesser evil than the near-total liquidation 
they suffered in the course of the war. Even before the war, they were a rather loose 
and amorphous group rather than the "party" that Western observers were in the habit 
of making them out to be. By the end of the war, however, they had virtually ceased to 
exist Most of them had fallen victim to the notorious Graziani Massacre. A few, like 
Hakim Warqenah Eshate and Bajerond Takla-Hawaryat, prolonged their exile and 
became totally marginalized on their return. Some, like Dr. Alamawarq Bayyana and 
poet-playwright Yoftahe Neguse, found it difficult to adjust to the post-1941 order and 
died soon after Liberation under what some people tend to believe were rather 
mysterious circumstances. lronically, the collaborators (banda) fared much better; with 
the exception of Afa,warq Gabra-Iyyasus, most of them were smoothly absorbed into 
the political order and some even rose to prominent positions. 
This paper examines the fate of the Ethiopian intelligentsia in the course of the 
war. Attention will be focussed on three aspects of the issue: the warnings by the 
intellectuals of the Italian danger and the place of these intellectuals in the preparations 
for war, their role in the Resistance or in the collaboration, and the activities of the 
exiles. The paper finally concludes with an assessment of the picture that emerged after 
Liberation. 
Warnings and Preparations 
It is of some interest that the earliest warning of Ethiopia's perilous position 
came before the euphoria generated by the Ethiopian victory at Adwa had even 
subsided. In the very same year in which that victory was scored, Blatta Gabra-
Egziabher Gila-Maryam was lamenting Ethiopia's humiliation and decline, which he 
traced back to the traumatic events of the sixteenth century. More immediately, this 
Eritrean irredentist who could not forgive Menilek's failure to liberate Eritrea from the 
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Italians, recommended the securing of a sea port as a matter of primary importance for 
Ethiopia's survival.1 About a decade and a half later, the doyen of Ethiopian 
intellectuals, Naggadras Gabra-Heywat Baykadagn, warned that the penalty for 
Ethiopia's failure to modernize would be devastation and enslavement: "If our Ethiopia 
accepts European mind [i.e. civilization], no one would dare attack her; if not, she will 
disintegrate and be enslaved." 2 In 1931, Gabra-Heywat's son, Ashaber, then studying 
in Switzerland, again drew attention to the danger inherent in Ethiopia's encirclement 
by colonial powers. He underlined the precarious nature of Ethiopia's independence 
because of her failure to secure a sea port and argued for "deux fenetres au moins, une 
sur la Mer Rouge, l'autre sur !'Ocean lndien, deux fenetres libres de tout contr6le. "3 
Two graduates of European universities returned to Ethiopia on the eve of the 
war and were assigned to posts where they could monitor Italian activities. The first of 
them was Mikael Tasamma, who had written a doctoral thesis in political science at the 
University of Rome but was denied permission to defend it because it was deemed too 
anti-Italian. On his return, he was appointed head of the Italian "desk" in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.4 The second was Tedla Haile, who wrote an MA thesis entitled 
"Pourquoi et comment pratiquer la politique d'assimilation en Ethiopie" to the Colonial 
University of Antwerp in Belgium in 1930.5 On the eve of the war, he was Ethiopian 
consul at Asmara. From that vantage point, he sent despatches (which, like most 
Ethiopian despatches of the time, were intercepted by the Italians) to Emperor Hayla-
Sellase and Foreign Minister Herny W alda-Sellase, recommending close surveillance of 
the border with Italian-ruled Eritrea, forwarding a plan to set fire to Italian garrisons in 
the area, and describing how the Eritrean population was ready to rise against the 
Italians but was discouraged by "the bad administration in Tegre, the non-surveillance 
of our borders, and what Italian representatives are doing in our country."6 Warning 
Irns Ms. No. 2171, "Ze Mashaf ... Waldu La Gila Maryam Za Tsa'da Krestiyan Hamasen" 
("Sue Memorie"), 1889 EC, I, 47, 56; cf. Tekeste Negash, "Blatta Gebre Egziabher Gila Mariam and 
His Works: A Sketch towards a Political Biography of a Nationalist," in No Medicine for the Bite of a 
White Snake: Notes on Nationalism and Resistance in Eritrea, 1890-1940 (Uppsala, 1986), 1-21. 
2"Ate Menilek-na Ityopya," in Berhan Yehun (Asmara, 1912), 354. 
3 Acheber Gabre-Hiot, La verite sur l'Ethiopie revelee apres le couronnement du Roi des Rois 
(Lausanne, 1931), 65-66. 
4Angelo de! Boca, Gli lta/iani in Africa orientale 2. La conquista dell' impero (Roma-Bari, 1986), 
232n. 
51 am greatly indebted to Dr. Dereje Welde Medhin of the Department of Economics of Addis 
Ababa University for making available to me from Belgium a copy of the thesis. 
6Del Boca, Gli Ita/iani, 232; cf. Arnaldo Cipolla, L'Abissinia in armi (Florence, 1935), 238-39, 
for Tedla's endeavors to construct an impressive building to house the Ethiopian consulate in Asmara. 
Although outside the scope of this paper in view of its retrospective character, Heywat Hedaru's 
observation on the role of European consulates in undermining Ethiopia's independence is worth noting 
here: Yachi Qan Tarassach: Ka Temhert Bet wada Qonsela Sera (Addis Ababa, 1967 EC), 13. Equally 
perceptive is his explanation of Ethiopia's defeat as the result of the transitional character of Ethiopian 
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about the Italian danger from the southeast was given by the Ohio-educated 
Bashahwerad Habta-Wald, director of the Dire Dawa municipality, in a letter to the 
emperor in 1932.7 
An institution established on the eve of the war, the Ethiopian Patriotic 
Association, helped to galvanize patriotic sentiments against the impending Italian 
aggression. It provided a forum above all for that sector of the new elite with a 
traditional educational background, like Makonnen Habta-Wald, one of its founders, 
and Yoftahe Neguse, Ethiopia's first modem playwright. In a speech to the association 
delivered on 1 Pagume 1927/6 September 1935 and later published in Atbya Kokab, 
one of the Amharic weeklies, and reproduced in the more famous Berhanena Salam, 
Makonnen castigated the world for its mindless arms race, detailed Italian arguments 
for expansion and argued that Italian aggressive designs had gained a new momentum 
because of fears that Ethiopia's earnest efforts to modernize would thwart Italy's long-
standing desire to colonize the country. 8 
Another active member of the association, Yoftahe Neguse, employed the 
allegorical technique so pervasive in Ethiopian literature to depict the dangerous 
portents hovering over Ethiopia, symbolized by a beautiful lady exciting the passions of 
a pack of lustful admirers, and to rouse the population against the imminent aggression 
by reciting the heroics of the famed warriors of the nineteenth century, Gobana, Alula, 
Daraso, and Makonnen.9 Yoftahe's celebrated play, Afajashegn, was also started at 
this time, though he only completed it later in exile in the Sudan. The plot revolves 
around the malaise of the heroine, Afajashegn (i.e. Ethiopia), who is visited by spirits 
(i.e. Fascists) as she was gripped in the throes of a malady. The spirits suggest that 
she surrender to their merciful treatment if she wants to be cured from her illness. Her 
well-wishers and her protectors, including her mogzit (custodian) Hayla-Leul (a barely 
disguised cover for Hayla-Sellase), are at a loss for a cure to Afajashegn's malady, 
Interestingly enough, they are adamantly against the suggestion that the matter be 
referred to the public, arguing that such a step would make the public aware of 
Afajashegn's ailments. The play concludes with a curse on all those who fail to rise up 
to the serious challenges of the time: 
He who continues to lead a life of mirth and fun 
While a deadly plague is raging 
society in 1935 (p. 18); Heywat draws on an Ethiopian proverb to drive his point home: "A woman 
who broke up herold earthenware pan before buying a new one ended up by starving her family." 
70Jd Ministry of Pen Archives (hereafter MPA) 514, Bashahwerad to Hayla-Sellase, 
16.8.24/24.4.32. 
8Berhanena Salam (BS). 3.10.35. 
9Mulugeta Seyum, "Ya Qagn Geta Yoftahe Neguse ya Heywat Tarik," BA thesis (HSIU: 
Ethiopian Languages & Literature, 1964 EC), 45-46. 
He who is not vigilant in the face of death 
May his soul perish with his body! 
For this is not a light matter 10 
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It is also of interest that another founding member of the Patriotic Association, 
the author W alda-Giyorgis Walda-Yohannes, composed a booklet entitled Ya Wand Lej 
Kurat (roughly rendered, "The Pride of a Son of the Fatherland"), of which up to 
40,000 copies were reportedly distributed to soldiers going to the war front and which 
they kept in their pockets like a prayer book. Ironically, Walda-Giyorgis later defected 
to the Italian side, serving as one of their propagandists.11 
Recommendations of a more strictly military nature came from Bajerond Takla-
Hawaryat three years before the outbreak of the war. These recommendations, 
contained in a comprehensive report submitted to the council of ministers, addressed 
fundamental issues of military organization and were not apparently merely concerned 
with the practical possibility of war with Italy. The thoroughness with which Takla-
Hawaryat handled the whole matter suggests that, although he had rarely had the 
chance to put it to practical use, he had apparently not quite forgotten the military 
training he had received in Russia in the first decade of the century. The prerequisites 
for military victory, he argued, were superiority in arms and manpower (both 
quantitatively and qualitatively), a co-ordinated strategy of attack and defense, eternal 
preparedness for war, a conscious policy of minimizing costs, in both financial and 
human terms, and high morale. Needless to say, the army has to be a regular and not a 
traditional one. He therefore recommended a re-organization of the Ethiopian military 
set-up. He was particularly scathing of the traditional system of supplies: 
Is a military victory at all conceivable in this epoch, if the army's 
provisions consist merely of baso (barley flour), derqosh (dried enjara) 
and roasted peas transported by pack animals or humans for a year or 
more, with a soldier who gets his water from an earthen jug or a gourd 
and who wears abujedid cloth that is subjected alternately to the rain and 
the sun? 12 
Yet Takla-Hawaryat's new scheme did not seem to provide for logistics. He 
proposed the creation of a modern army with seven divisions (infantry, cavalry, 
IOyoftahe Neguse, "Afajashegn," typescript at JES (Addis Ababa, 1965), 31; cf. another 
allegorical story by a certain Tsagga Za-Ab, possibly a pseudonym, which appeared in Berhanena 
Salam as early as 21 January 1926, narrating the story of Ato Dubala (i.e. Ethiopia) and Ato Yalatu 
(Italy). Dubala had once beaten Yalatu as the latter tried to trespass on the former•s land and he was 
celebrating his victory (Adwa) every year while Yalatu was teaching his children the history of that 
ignominous defeat and preparing them to take revenge. 
11Feqada Adara, "Ya Blatta Walda-Giyorgis Walda-Yohannes ya Heywat Tarik-na ya Dersat 
Serawochachaw," BA thesis (AAU: Ethiopian Languages & Literature, 1974 EC), 12. 
12MPA 369, 12.1.25/22.9.32. 
artillery, navy, engineering corps, machine gun and tank corps and aviation engineers), 
the recruitment of young blood and the retirement of the old soldiers by resettling them 
as farmers, and the introduction of military service lasting three to five years. But he 
cautioned against haste and the forcible imposition of the new structure. 
This cautionary note was amplified by Takla-Hawaryat's fellow minister and 
one-time contributor to Berhanena Salam, Bitwaddad Getachaw Abata, the minister of 
the interior. Apparently reacting to the same bill on military organization and taxation 
that was presented to the Senate on 23 December 1931 and which seems to have 
triggered Takla-Hawaryat's elaborate response, Getachaw expressed great trepidation 
on the issue. He was particularly apprehensive of the suggestion that the old soldiers 
should give way to young recruits. Ethiopia, he pleaded in the end, had too little time 
to experiment with new ideas of military organization. If only by default, therefore, he 
urged a return to old systems and values: 
As read to us in His Imperial Majesty's notice, we are caught between 
our old traditions and the new civilization. Since we still have a long 
way to go to attain that civilization, what is best for us is to hurry back 
to our former traditions and keep our old warriors happy by making 
shwn-sher, bestowing decorations and arms, giving banquets regularly, 
cheering them up, letting them chant their war-songs, and making a lot 
of noise. 13 
Someone who saw no danger whatsoever coming from Italy was the novelist 
and essayist Afawarq Gabra-Iyyasus. In view of his later career as the ideologue of 
the Fascist order, this is perhaps not surprising. Not only did he write glowing 
accounts of the boost that Mussolini's regime gave to Italian agricultural production, 14 
but he was even prepared to vouch for the pacifism of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and 
militarist Japan! He listed the military expenditures of fifty-seven states in 1932, 
showing that the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain ranked as the four 
highest, with Italy, Germany, and Japan coming after that. 15 In another article, 
Afawarq portrayed the Fascist regime in Italy as a model worthy of emulation by 
others: 
Because the Fascist regime made people work with one mind, one will 
and one voice, it has made Italy to-day the source of good politics. The 
13MPA 369, n.d. 
14BS, 16.5.29. 
15Bs, 4.2.32. While the listing is substantially accurate (See Keesings Contemporary Archives 
1931-34), what Afawarq concluded from the figures is questionable. I am grateful to David Chapple for 
making available to me the pertinent literature. 
entire world has now started to become desirous of drinking from that 
source. 16 
Statements of the above nature could hardly have helped to dispel the suspicion 
with which Afawarq increasingly came to be regarded in Ethiopia; his opponents 
accused him of carrying two passports, one Ethiopian and the other Italian, for use as 
the occasion required. 17 
Given Afawarq's controversial background, it is indeed amazing, as Angelo Del 
Boca also emphasizes, 18 that Hayla-Sellase chose him to represent Ethiopia in Rome at 
such a critical hour, he was designated Ethiopia's minister in the Italian capital at about 
the same time that Hakim Warqenah was sent to London and Bajerond Takla-Hawaryat 
to Paris and Geneva, where the League of Nations had its seat. The emperor 
apparently counted more on Afawarq's ability to understand the Italians than on his 
capacity or desire to dissuade them from attacking Ethiopia. 
What precisely moved the emperor to designate these three prominent 
intellectuals to what were at that particular historical conjuncture the four most 
important venues of diplomatic activity for the country can only be guessed Given his 
exaggerated faith in diplomacy, he might have felt that those posts required special 
intellectual endowments which only the designees possessed. Moreover, two of them 
were intimately associated with the countries of their designation. Warqenah was 
virtually British by upbringing. Afawarq was married to an Italian and had spent the 
most productive phase of his career in Italy. Takla-Hawaryat had a briefer sojourn in 
France and could speak French. Yet, behind these cogent reasons for their 
assignments, one could discern a more cynical one, namely that for Hayla-Sellase, once 
he had consolidated his political power, the intellectuals had outlived their usefulness 
and might have even become a nuisance, especially in the case ofTakla-Hawaryat, who 
was capable of raising too many unpleasant questions for the emperor. At least one 
observer saw Heruy's hand in Warqenah's successive shunting away from the center, 
first as governor of Charchar and then as minister to London. 19 There is also evidence 
that Takla-Hawaryat resented his diplomatic posting and tried hard to persuade the 
emperor to rescind the appointment.20 
In the end, Warqenah appears to have been relatively the most successful of the 
three diplomats. This was partly no doubt due to the fact that he had the good luck to 
operate in an ambience with which he was familiar and with the advantage of the strong 
16ss, 26.6.30. 
17 See Afawarq's self-defence in BS, 11. 7 .29 and 20. 7.33. 
18DeJ Boca Gliltaliani, 195-96. 
190ra1 communication from Dr. Ammanuel Gabra-Sellase, educated in Scotland in the years 1932 
to 1934. 
20MPA 335, Takla-Hawaryat to Hayla Sellase, 30.4.25/9.11.32. 
wave of solidarity for Ethiopia organized and led by Sylvia Pankhurst. By contrast, 
Afawarq's Italophilia and gullibility caught even the Italian officials by surprise. He 
ended up sending messages of reassurance to Addis Ababa, stating that Italy had no 
aggressive designs on Ethiopia and that the arms then being despatched to the colonies 
were for defensive purposes only! While his own predilections for Fascist rule had 
already become manifest, the shortage of funds at his disposal compounded the 
problem by forcing him to send his telegrams to Addis Ababa via the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs!21 In March 1935, as Mussolini and Marshal De Bono were looking 
for ways of enticing Ras Seyum of Tegre over to their side, Afawarq reportedly 
volunteered to help by suggesting an intermediary to convey Italian overtures. 22 
Lessona, under-secretary of the Italian Ministry of Colonies, had this to say of 
Afawarq: 
We have not bought him. They say he is amenable to such offers. He 
believes in our policy of pacification. Above all, he believes in our kind 
of civilization. He thinks that only Italy can redeem his country.23 
As for Takla-Hawaryat, he soon found himself in a diplomatic whirlpool for 
which he had scarcely been prepared. The Walwal Incident and Ethiopia's decision to 
take the issue to the League of Nations suddenly catapulted him to the center stage of 
international diplomacy. Although assisted by the French lawyer Gaston Jeze, he met 
obstruction from the British and French governments at practically every step. He was 
so overwhelmed by the hostility towards Ethiopia that he once reportedly wept.24 But 
he did not leave the stage before making an impassioned plea on behalf of his country 
and exposing the hypocritical stance the Powers assumed in the name of neutrality: 
Is that real neutrality? Is it just? Will the Council [of the League] 
remain unmoved in face of this situation, which is growing steadily 
worse? Will it allow this unequal combat to continue between two 
Members of the League of Nations, one of which, all powerful, is in a 
position to employ, and declares that it is employing, all its resources in 
preparing for aggression, while the other, weak and pacific, and 
mindful of its international undertakings, is deprived of the means of 
organizing the defence of its territory and its very existence, both of 
which are threatened? Will the Council assume responsibility, in the 
21Del Boca G/iltaliani, 253-54. 
22Ibid., 310. 
23Ibid., 311. 
24Gennachaw Takla-Hawaryat, in the introduction to the unpublished autobiography of his father, 
Bajerond Takla-Hawaryat, copy available in the Department of History (AAU), 22. 
eyes of the world, for allowing preparations to continue unchecked for 
the massacre of a people which constitutes a menace to none?25 
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A few words, finally, on a group of intellectuals who played a more 
subordinate role at the outset but of whom some were to be closely associated with the 
emperor during his exile and his final return. These included Blatta Kidana-Maryam 
Abarra, director of the Ministry of Education and entrusted with the task of handling 
the swelling European press on the eve of the war; 26 the Hungarian journalist Ladislas 
Farago described him as a member of the emperor's "Brain Trust".27 Another person 
close to the emperor was Tasfaye Tagagn, direcor-general of the Foreign Ministry.28 
Three Ethiopians of Eritrean origin who were also very close to the emperor were 
Dawit Ogbagzy, assigned to assist Kidana-Maryam in handling the European press; 
Efrem Tawalda-Madhen, one-time English teacher at the Tafari Makonnen school and 
later Ethiopian consul-general in Paris; and Lorenzo Taezaz. Lorenzo had been sent by 
the emperor to Montpelier (in France) to study law. On his return, he came to play 
successive key roles. He was posted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was with 
the Anglo-Ethiopian Boundary Commission at the outbreak of the Walwal crisis in 
1934; he accompanied the emperor first to Maychaw and then into exile, and was, with 
Dawit and Tasfaye, on the emperor's side at Geneva when he made his famous speech 
in the summer of 1936. After serving as the emperor's courier to Gojjam and 
Bagemder in 1938 and 1939, he marched with the emperor to Goijam in 1940 and then 
left for Kenya to organize the Ethiopian refugees there. 29 
Resistance and Collaboration 
The role of the intelligentsia, or the Young Ethiopians as they came to be 
known, in the actual conduct of the war of 1935-36 was minimal. The only person 
who can perhaps be regarded as the exception was Dajjazmach Nasibu Zamanuel, 
generally regarded as one of the moving spirits of the "Young Ethiopian Party. "30 As 
mayor of Addis Ababa from 1922 to 1932, he was distinguished for giving the city the 
first serious municipal administration in its history. He played a pivotal role in the 
agitation that culminated in the coronation of Tafari Makonnen as negus in 1928. At the 
outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Italy, he was governor of Harar province 
25Quoted in George W. Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War (Cambridge (Mass.), 
1967), 273. See also ibid, 103-105, 150. 
26G.L. Steer, Caesar in Abyssinia (London, 1936), 34-35. 
271.adislas Farago, Abyssinia on the Eve (London, 1935), 162. 
28John Spencer, Ethiopia at Bay (Algonac, 1984), 14. 
29nel Boca G/i lta/iani, 97, 189n, 740; Salome Gabre Egziabher, "The Ethiopian Patriots 1936-
1941," Ethiopia Observer, XII, 2 (1969), 82. 
30Archiveo Centrale di Stato (ACS), Italy, Graziani Papers (GP) 12/19/2; Del Boca G/i Ita/iani, 
97. 
and he assumed supreme command of the Ethiopian troops on the Ogaden front. He 
later went into exile with the emperor, and died in exile. Tedla Haile, who had been 
monitoring Italian activities from his post at the Ethiopian consulate in Asmara, crossed 
the Marab River on the outbreak of hostilities; he died before he reached Addis Ababa, 
of illness according to one informant, fighting against the Italians with Ras Seyum's 
force according to another.31 
According to Angelo Del Boca, the liquidation of the "Young Ethiopians" was 
high on Mussolini's agenda from the outset; an order for their summary execution had 
been sent to Field Marshal Badoglio as early as 3 May 1936, i.e. as the Italian troops 
were preparing to enter Addis Ababa. 32 On the part of the intellectuals, implacable 
opposition to Italian rule seems to have started at about the same time. During the riots 
that rocked the capital in the interval between the emperor's flight and the Italian entry, 
Kidana-Maryam was said to have been busy organizing the youth and women of the 
capital for a war of resistance. 33 Leaflets rousing the city's population to an uprising 
against the Italians in June-July 1936, probably to coincide with the ill-fated five-
pronged Patriot offensive on the capital, might also have been authored by some of the 
intellectuals like Kidana-Maryam. The city-dwellers were enjoined to kill all Fascists at 
a signal from those who issued the proclamation; the Eritrean askari, who had been 
forced to fight for the Italians, were to be spared, however.34 
The Italians faced the most serious intellectual opposition to their occupation of 
Ethiopia from the Black Lion organization. The leadership of that organization, both 
political and military, was clearly drawn from among the educated elite. Its president 
was the British-educated veterinary surgeon, Dr. Alamawarq Bayyana. Most of the fire 
and spirit of the group appears to have come from three other young Ethiopians, also 
British-educated: Faqada-Sellase (alias George) Herny, son of the foreign minister, 
and the brothers Benyam and Yosef Warqenah, sons of the Ethiopian minister to 
London. Military leadership was provided by the young cadet-officers of Holata, like 
Kefle Nasibu, son of Dajjach Nasibu Zamanuel, and Balay Hayla-Ab, another 
Ethiopian of Eritrean origin. These young officers, most of them between 15 and 20, 
had been recruited largely from Tafari Makonnen School to join the newly established 
Holata military school in 1934. In one of the most meteoric accelerations in the history 
of military promotions, they had risen to ranks of up to lieutenant-colonel in a matter of 
time. 
31Respectively, Dr. Ammanuel Gabra-Sellase and W/o Elizabeth Warqenah, Tedla's wife at the 
32Del Boca Gli Ita/iani, 730. 
33Jbid., 699; cf. Steer, 34. 
34 ACS, GP 14/20/7. 
twelve months; the highest rank was attained by four of them, including Kefle and 
Balay.35 
The Black Lion were significant in the history of the Resistance probably more 
for what they set out to achieve than for what they actually accomplished. In this 
respect, their ten-point constitution could be described as a manifesto for a nation-wide, 
politically motivated and ethically conducted resistance. Among the most striking 
features of that constitution were the affirmation of the supremacy of the political over 
the military command, the provisions for the humane treatment of prisoners and the 
non-molestation of the peasantry, the prohibition of exile, and the injunction of suicide 
rather than capture by the enemy.36 However, their military operations, while heroic, 
had no durable impact on the occupation. Their most dramatic feat of arms, the burning 
of an Italian plane at Bonaya (near Naqamte) in June 1936, was ultimately more of 
negative than of positive value. Not only did it provoke Italian retaliation but it also 
resulted in the withdrawal of support for the Black Lion by the local ruler, Dajjazmach 
Habta-Maryam, who, for fear of being caught in the Italian backlash, asked them to 
leave his territory. 37 
The Black Lion then had to retreat further west, in search of both a base and a 
leader who would give greater respectability to their youthful endeavours. The latter 
they found in Ras Emeru, who happened to be in Gore at the time. Totally 
disheartened by the superiority of Italian armor that he had witnessed at first hand on 
the Shere front and probably convinced of the futility of further resistance, Emeru was 
contemplating exile in the Sudan or Uganda when the Black Lion descended on him 
and persuaded him to assume leadership. Reluctantly he agreed. The whole force, the 
young warriors and Emeru's veterans, then struck out on a bold campaign towards the 
capital. Faced with opposition from the Oromo inhabitants en route, however, they 
were forced to deflect their course to the southwest, first in the direction of Jimma and 
then, when they encoutered hostility there too, towards Bonga. Although the mobile 
and highly motivated force was able to inflict some early damage on the Italians, it was 
soon encumbered by the large number of non-combatants who, harassed by the Oromo 
population, had joined its ranks. Apparently realizing the untenability of his position, 
Emeru surrendered in late December 1936. He was whisked off to the capital and 
thence to Italy, where he spent the remaining years of the Occupation in captivity. For 
the time being, members of the Black Lion organization who had surrendered at the 
same time were left in peace.38 
35General Virgin, The Abyssinia I Knew (London, 1936), 118-123; Taddasa Mecha, Tequr 
Anbasa ba Me'rab ltyopya (Asmara, n.d.), 24-28. 
36Taddasa, Tequr Anbasa ba Me'rab ltyopya, 22-23. 
31Ibid., 40ff; Ministry of Defence, Ya Qadamawi Hayla-Sellase Tor Temhert Bet Tarik ka 1927 
eska 1949 (Addis Ababa, 1950 EC), 80. 
38Taddasa, Tequr Anbasa ba Me'rab I tyopy, 61-107. 
But their day of reckoning was not far away. On 19 February 1937, less than 
two months after their surrender, an abortive attempt took place on the life of the Italian 
viceroy, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, which was followed by the nefarious Graziani 
Massacre. The chief executors of the plot against the viceroy, Abraha Daboch and 
Mogas Asgadom, were both former students of Tafari Makonnen school. But the 
Fascists did not require this particular piece of information - and, at the beginning, 
they were not quite sure as to the authorship of the attack -to direct their revenge 
towards the educated elite. There was already Mussolini's standing order and the 
assassination attempt created the perfect setting for its execution. All those intellectuals 
whom the Italians could lay their hands on were rounded up and most of them were 
shot after perfunctory interrogations. These included many of the leaders of the Black 
Lion, including Faqada-Sellase, Ben yarn, Yusef, Kefle, anti Balay. 39 
Singled out as the mastermind of the whole plot was Bashahwerad Habta-W ald, 
who had earlier accompanied the emperor into exile but had then returned and settled in 
Addis Ababa. According to one informant, the very fact of his return from exile was 
apparently one of the circumstances that made him a prime suspect in the eyes of the 
Italians. Given his proximity to the exiled emperor, Bashahwerad's return to Ethiopia 
could only signify that he must have been entrusted with a special mission. Second, 
the Italians had discovered that he had double-crossed them by inserting a coded phrase 
(lagizew, or "for the time being") in a leaflet urging the people of Marhabete to submit, 
which the Italians had persuaded him to draft. Third, the Italians had prior information, 
courtesy of the emperor's private secretary, Qagnazmach Takla-Marqos, who later 
defected to their side, that Bahshahwerad had been getting copies of Italian legation 
papers through an Eritrean agent before the war. At any rate, Bashahwerad was 
interrogated with particular severity, and he might well have died under torture. 40 
The Graziani Massacre marked the almost total liquidaton of the intellectual 
component of the Resistance. Thereafter, only two persons who were rather 
marginally connected to the intelligentsia could be said to have played any role in the 
Resistance. These wereBlatta Takkala Walda-Hawaryat andLej (later Dajjach) Dames 
Walda-Ammanuel. Takkala belonged to what has come to be identified as the Raguel 
school of the intelligentsia, which has produced such successful politicans as Herny 
Walda-Sellase and Makonnen Habta-Wald. He was one of the regular contributors to 
Berhanena Salam in the 1920s. He had earlier served as customs director in western 
39see Senedu Gabru, Ya Lebe Masha/ {Addis Ababa, 1942 EC), for pictures of most of those 
executed, taken while they were awaiting execution. Cf. FO 371/20921, Stonehewer-Bird to Eden, 
9.3.37; Bond to Eden, 20.2.37. See Mulugeta, "Ya Qagn Geta Yoftahe Neguse ya Heywat Tarik," 
appendix, for letters of Heruy to Yoftahe, 30.10.29/7.7.37 and 22.4.30/31.12.37, on the death of his 
son, Faqada-Sellase, and the internment of other members of his family, and of Warqenah to Yoftahe, 
1.11.29/8.7.37, on the execution of his two sons and the deportation of his wife and daughters. 
40Qral communication from Ato Sebhatu Gabra-Iyyasus, brother-in-law of Bashahwerad; his 
infonnation was corroborated by Wayzaro Elizabeth Gabra-Iyyasus, Bashahwerad's wife. 
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Ethiopia (posts in customs administration then generally being filled by the educated 
elite) and was director-general of the Addis Ababa municipality at the outbreak: of the 
war. He was an ardent advocate of guerrilla warfare from the moment hostilities with 
Italy began and was one of the three dissenting voices (the two others being Herny and 
Dajjach Yeggazu Bahabte) when the crown council decided that the emperor should 
seek exile. Thereafter, he became an implacable opponent of Hayla-Sellase, exploring 
alternative options for Ethiopia ranging from using Yohannes Iyyasu, one of the sons 
of the emperor deposed in 1916, as a front emperor to republican govenment. 41 
Dames Walda-Ammanuel played a crucial role in the quasi-diplomatic phase of 
the Shawan Resistance led by Ras Abbaba Aragay. Dames had been to the Adventist 
Mission school in Addis Ababa and was a graduate of Menilek II School. He had then 
served in the alcohol monopoly and as chief financial officer in the Ministry of 
Commerce. He was arrested twice by the Italians, the second time in the round-up 
following the Graziani incident. Released a second time, probably because his captors 
were oblivious to his earlier record, Dames joined the patriot leader Lej Hayla-Maryam 
Mammo and, on the latter's death, Ras Abbaba. 42 Abbaba entrusted him with the 
rather dangerous mission of engaging the Italians in a diplomatic charade: negotiating 
with the Italian governor of Shawa, General Nasi, in order to give Abbaba time to 
regroup his battered force. Dames executed the task with considerable skill, but the 
Italians eventualy read through the ploy and detained him.43 He was indeed lucky to 
have come out alive from the whole exercise. 
Whether the Graziani Massacre contributed to an increase in the number of 
collaborators from among the intelligentsia is something that requires further 
investigation. While it is true that collaboration antedates the Massacre, it might very 
well be argued that some of the intellectuals might have been induced to collaborate by 
the ferocity of the Fascist repression following the Massacre. It is clear that there were 
both collaborators and ardent patriots among the intelligentsia, just as in the rest of 
Ethiopian society. The defectors to the Fascist cause included persons who had 
worked very closely with the emperor, such as his private secretary Qagnazmach Tak:la-
Marqos Walda-Gabrel (promoted dajjazmach and appointed "Ya Salale Abagaz" by the 
Italians).44 A prominent group that went over to the Fascist side has sometimes been 
referred to as the Catholic party, led by their mentor Blatten Geta Walda-Maryam, who 
41Much of the above information is to be found in Anthony Mockler, Haile Se/lasise's War: The 
Italian-Ethiopian Campaign, 1935-1941 (New York, 1984), passim. But see also Tasfaye Abbaba, 
"The Life and Career of Dajjazmach Takkala Walda Hawaryat," BA thesis (HSIU: History, 1970); 
Mulusaw Meteku, Ya Arbagnoch Tege/ ka Fascist Gar: Ka Shawa eska Sudan Tara/ (Addis Ababa, 
1937 EC), 46; and Heywat Hedaru, 239-240. 
42Mulatu Gabru, Malektagnaw ltyopyawi Arbagna (Addis Ababa, 1965 EC), 113-121. 
43oarnes Walda-Ammanuel; Ya Qesar Manges/ Malektagna, 31/3-6/4.40. 
44Ya Qesar Manges/ Malektagna, 19-25.5.40 and 26/5-1/6.40; Mulusaw, 23, 49. 
had succeeded Takla-Hawaryat as Ethiopian minister in Paris and as chief of the 
Ethiopian delegation at the League of Nations in Geneva.45 The group included 
Berhana Marqos, Ethiopian charge d'affaires at Ankara on the outbreak of the war and 
already judged by Italian intelligence as not too averse to the idea of an Italian 
protectorate;46 Blattta Ayyala Gabre, one-time president of the Special Court; and 
Balachaw Jamanah, director-general of Posts and Telecommunications.47 
Two intellectuals who put their considerable literary endowments to the service 
of Fascism were Blatta W alda-Giyorgis W alda-Y ohannes and Afawarq Gabra-Iyyasus. 
As we have already seen, on the eve of the war, Walda-Giyorgis was one of those 
writing exhortative songs calling for the defense of the motherland. During the first 
two years of the Occupation, he is said to have remained in hiding. He then gave 
himself up and started to work for Fascist propaganda in the weekly Ya Qesar Mangest 
Malektagna. 48 But there was no one who could rival Afawarq Gabra-Iyyasus for the 
dedication with which he served the Fascist cause and the virulence with which he 
attacked the Resistance. 
On the outbreak of the war in October 1935, Afawarq had returned to Ethiopia 
from his diplomatic post in Rome. His return, his admirers emphasized, was 
incontrovertible evidence of his love for his country and it was contrasted with the 
defection at about the same time of Dajjazmach Hayla-Sellase Gugsa of eastern 
Tegray.49 In February 1936, apparently on instructions from the emperor, Afawarq 
was engaged in futile negotiations with the Italians for a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict. The terms proposed by Afawarq included Italian control over parts of Tegray 
and of the Ogaden, Borana, and Arsi, and appointment of six Italian advisers to the 
Ethiopian government to facilitate the exploitation of the country's economic resources. 
In return, the Italians were to recognize the emperor's sovereignty over the rest of 
Ethiopia, to cede Asab as a free port, and to pay Ethiopia 1.5 million lire. The two 
countries were then to sign a convention of mutual assistance in the event of aggression 
by a third party.50 But Mussolini found the terms unattractive, and the negotiations 
became altogether irrelevant after the decisive Italian victory at Maychaw. 
Once the Italians entered Addis Ababa and established their rule, it did not take 
Afawarq too long to decide to serve them. He used the full power of his literary venom 
to ridicule the exiled emperor and to disparage the Resistance. He christened 5 May 
450ra1 communication from Dr. Ammanuel Gabra-Sellase. 
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1936, the day Italian troops entered Addis Ababa, the beginning of an Era of Mercy 
(Amata Mehrat) - comparable to the beginning of the Christian Era on 1 A.D. He 
abused the guerrilla fighters as wild worms (ya dur teloch) and had only contempt for 
their bid to upset the Fascist order: 
When Italian troops entered the capital, only a few, a tiny few, went into 
the bush. They know that, let alone they, even the king who had prided 
himself as the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah has been reduced 
from a lion to a rabbit and fled for his life. These wild worms have 
become shefta merely to plunder the cattle of the poor, law-abiding 
peasantry; there is no other explanation for it. 51 
In another issue,52 Afawarq wrote an article entitled "The plight of my former 
master Ate Hayla-Sellase is highly pathetic and amazing," in which he wrote derisively 
how the exiled emperor had swallowed his pride and was being taken around by his 
advisers to collect relief money in his name. Afawarq's partisanship for the Fascist 
cause was so excessive that it provoked another contemporary intellectual, "Professor" 
Tamrat Ammanuel, to write retrospectively: 
As if serving, uncalled for, the enemy that had occupied one's country 
were not enough, [Afawarq], to underline his loyalty to the enemy, 
dishonoured his pen by heaping abuse on those fighting for their 
country, from the emperor down to the ordinary patriot. 53 
Afawarq's fulsome espousal of the Fascist cause did not save him from being 
caught in the Fascist backlash following the attempt on the life of Graziani. He was 
deported to Italy along with other notables including the arch-collaborator Ras Haylu of 
Gojjam. Repatriated with the first batch in 1938, Afawarq was elevated to what was 
perhaps the highest post occupied by an Ethiopian in the Fascist hierarchy, Afa Qesar, 
on 9 May 1939.54 
The Exiles 
Resistance or collaboration were two of three options left to Ethiopian 
intellectuals, as indeed to all prominent Ethiopians, during the Italian Occupation. The 
third option was exile. And many did take that option. Most sought refuge in the 
neighboring colonies - French and British Somaliland, Kenya, and the Sudan. A few 
went further - to Jerusalem, Europe, and the United States. While most lived in 
51 Ya Qesaru Manges/ Malektagna, 13.1.29/23.9.36, quoted in Zeqargachaw Hayla-Giyorgis, "Ya 
Naggadras Afawarq Gabra-Iyyasus za Behera Zage ya Heywat Tarik," BA thesis (HSIU: Ethiopian 
Languages & Literature, 1964 EC), 24. 
52That of 6.12.29/12.8.37, quoted in Zeqargachaw thesis, 25-27. 
53Quoted in ibid., 27. 
54stella, "Un personaggio amletico," 600. 
obscurity and waited hopefully for the day of their return, some played a more active 
role in building up solidarity for Ethiopia or acting as liaison between the exiled 
emperor and the Resistance groups. This paper focuses on three such active exiles: 
Yoftahe Neguse in the Sudan, Hakim Warqenah in England, and Malaku Bayyan in the 
United States. 
Yoftahe Neguse 
Yoftahe managed to escape to the Sudan under rather dramatic circumstances. 
He evaded the Italians when they came looking for him in July 1936, went into hiding 
for a few days, and then left the capital for western Ethiopia disguised as a priest. On 
his way, he briefly joined with Dajjach Balcha's force and fought against the Italians in 
the southwestern outskirts of the capital. He then made his way first to Illubabor and 
next to Wallaga. Disguised as a bahtawi (hermit) with prophetic powers, he played on 
the gullibility of Yohannes Jote, the governor of southwestern Wallaga, by assuring 
him that the day when the throne would fall into his hands was at hand. After thus 
lulling his suspicions, he stealthily proceeded to the frontier and crossed into the Sudan 
in May 1937, some ten months after he had left Addis Ababa.55 
From the outset, both the emperor and his secretary, Walda-Giyorgis Walda-
Yohannes (the future tsahafe te'ezaz) took great interest in the poet in exile. The 
emperor sent him 20 guineas to help alleviate the initial difficulties of settlement while 
Walda-Giyorgis intervened successfully to save Yoftahe from deportation from 
Khartoum to Gedaref. Once settled, Y oftahe divided his time between his literary 
activity and correspondence with the emperor and his entourage and liaising with the 
patriots in the country. He continued to work on his masterpiece, Afajashegn, and 
finished two other works, Dabra Tseyon and Amata Mehrat. From his correspondence 
with the emperor and Walda-Giyorgis, appended to Mulugeta's extremely valuable 
senior essay, it emerges that both had great respect for his literary talent and ardent 
patriotism and both went to some length to convey their special sentiments towards 
him. In one of his letters, dated 19 Magabit 1929/28 March 1937, the emperor wrote· 
We had great admiration for your works, produced without the benefit 
of observing the techniques of European play writing, and We had 
hoped that they would serve Us as a guideline for what We planned to 
do for Our people.56 
Another letter, written on 3 Ter 1931/11 January 1939, suggests that the task of 
keeping up the spirits of the dejected exiles would have been much easier if the 
playwright had been close by the emperor's side:57 
55Mulugeta, "Ya Qagn Geta Yoftahe Neguse ya Heywat Tarik," appendix. 
56Jbid. 
57Ibid. 
As Our ideas and your ideas are not far apart, it would have been 
possible to revive the spirits of the exiles by making them drink from the 
fountain of knowledge, through allegorical or direct instruction, if you 
had been close by. 
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Two other persons who corresponded with Yoftahe from Europe were 
Makonnen Habta-Wald and Walda-Giyorgis Walda-Yohannes; the former was in exile 
in France. Apparently responding to a desire Y oftahe had earlier expressed to move to 
Europe, Makonnen wrote back to ask Y oftahe to send him a description of his 
qualifications and a photograph- minus his turban!58 Walda-Giyorgis was clearly the 
one with whom Y oftahe appears to have corresponded most often. The emperor and 
his secretary had apparently taken Yoftahe so much into their confidence that Walda-
Giyorgis even wrote to him informing him about Mussolini's offer of money to the 
emperor in return for his renunciation of his claim to the throne, adding 
I am compelled to divulge to you this secret that I had kept for so long 
so that you would know the whole truth and would not dissipate your 
energy pondering these things when you could use it more profitably. 59 
In another letter, Walda-Giyorgis expressed his boundless admiration for 
Yoftahe's literary talent and urged him to write down what could be his magnum opus: 
I propose that you set yourself the task of writing a book that will 
benefit your people and make your name immonal, a book of greater 
value than the Bible, a book depicting in your usual graceful style what 
you have seen, heard and observed, and what Ethiopia has been made to 
endure. I know you are capable of it and I suggest you write it in the 
form of a play.60 
Y oftahe also served as liaison between the emperor in exile and the patriots 
fighting the Fascist occupation, particularly those in Gojjam and Bagemder. He 
transmitted correspondence and crossed over into Ethiopia on a number of occasions.61 
But his activity, both literary and political, was hindered by his poor health 62 and his 
uneasy financial situation. The prolific contributor to Berhanena Salam, Blatta Deressa 
Amante, who had also sought asylum in the Sudan, was financially more fonunate, as 
he owned a number of bars in Khartoum; he is said to have sold one of them to the 
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Hakim Warqenah 
England was of course the center of the exiles, by virtue both of the emporer's 
presence and the concentration of high-calibre individuals there. These included the 
foreign minister Herny, who remained the emperor's closest companion until his death 
in September 1938. He was reportedly engaged in teaching Amharic and Geez at the 
London School of Oriental Studies (the future SOAS).64 Politically, however, he 
maintained a subdued existence. By contrast, Hakim Warqenah was in the thick of the 
fray, battling it out with the pro-Italian British authorities and rousing the British public 
to expressions of solidarity with Ethiopia. In this he was greatly assisted by Sylvia 
Pankhurst and her weekly, New Times and Ethiopia News, to which Warqenah 
contributed regularly; hardly a week passed without an article by him. He castigated 
the League of Nations for its failure to save Ethiopia from invasion, likening the 
international organization to an insurance company that had failed to honor its 
obligations. 65 He tried in vain to avert the decision of the 16th session of the League 
to lift the sanctions imposed on Italy, arguing "Ethiopia is not dead; she will not allow 
herself to be buried. "66 He launched an ambitious appeal to raise 2 million pounds 
sterling for the relief, as was reported, of the "Wounded, Homeless and Blinded. "67 
He also exposed the officially neutral stand of powers like Britain and wrote that people 
in Europe were capable of being moved to compassion for an injured animal but 
showed little concern at the death of innocent human beings, "especially if the 
unfortunate victims happen to be far away and to belong to another race or colour. "68 
His major argument with the British authorities revolved around the issue of the 
"Gore Government," the institution that had been set up in western Ethiopia following 
the emperor's flight, more than anything else a sort of public relations exercise aimed at 
denyig legitimacy to the Italian Occupation. Strangely enough in view of his own 
disenchantment with the British authorities, W arqenah asked them to extend financial 
assistance to the government. The British were of course in no mood to offer such 
assistance and even imposed a ban on the import of arms and restrictions on the 
issuance of visas to Ethiopians proceeding to western Ethiopia via the Sudan. 69 On the 
other hand, Warqenah felt that British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was 
deliberately giving prominence to the Western Galla Confederation, a collection of 
Wallaga notables who had officially sought British mandate to avert Italian rule. In the 
64Lamma Walcla-Maryam, "Ya Blaten Geta Herny Walcla-Sellase Heywat Tarik:, 1871-1931," BA 
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65New Times and Ethiopia News (NTEN), 23.5.36. 
66NTEN, 20.6.36. 
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68NTEN, 17.10.36. 
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end, the British ignored the Oromo appeal. But Warqenah found the foreign 
secretary's stance in the matter injurious to Ethiopia's overall interests, and wrote: 
I should be much obliged if you would be so good as to let me know the 
reason for your taking the trouble repeatedly & unasked to make the 
statements which, to say the least, is doubtful and is certainly 
detrimental to the already ill-used Ethiopia. For a giant to go out of his 
way to kick a wounded pigmy, does not appear to me to be the kind of 
treatment which you or the British People would like to indulge in. 70 
Unlike Yoftahe's, Warqenah's relations with the emperor were far from 
smooth. From the start, Warqenah appears to have conducted his press campaigns 
largely on his own initiative rather than following detailed instructions from the 
emperor. But it was not so much his independence as disagreements over finances that 
finally darkened their relationship and ultimately led to its rupture. 71 The death of his 
two sons, Benyam and Yosef, in the course of the Graziani Massacre in February 1937 
must also have weighed heavily on the old man's heart. As his own financial position 
became precarious, Warqenah was forced to sell the legation building, which he had 
originally bought on his own account, and seek settlement in India, where life would be 
less expensive. After making repeated pleas to the British authorities, he was finally 
allowed to settle in India with some other refugees under his care. Generosity and 
concern for others remained the distinctive mark of the amiable old man, even when his 
own situation was anything but enviable. 
MalakuBayyan 
Dr. Malaku Bayyan was a relation of the emperor and had grown up under his 
patronage while he was still Tafari Makonnen. Malaku had a BA from Muskingum 
College in Ohio, an MA in chemistry from Ohio State University, and a medical degree 
from Howard. He had broken off an engagement to an Ethiopian girl to get married to 
an Afro-American one. This marriage link as well as the Howard and later Harlem 
ambience in which Malaku lived largely account for his ability to build a strong feeling 
of solidarity with Ethiopia among the Afro-American community. But he was not the 
only Ethiopian who tried to encourage Afro-American identification with Ethiopia. As 
early as 1919, Kantiba Gabru, during his visit to the United States as a member of an 
official Ethiopian delegation, had proposed a scheme for Afro-American settlement in 
Ethiopia to the Harlem religious leader, Arnold Ford. Hakim Warqenah had also 
suggested to Malaku in 1927 that he work along those lines. One apparent result of 
70po 371/20209, Martin (Warqenah) to Eden, 2.11.36. 
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these encouraging signals was the migration of a number of Afro-Americans to Ethiopia 
in the early 1930s.72 
The outbreak of the war found Malaku in Ethiopia. He accompanied the 
emperor to Maychaw and later into exile. From England, he moved on to his natural 
political habitat in Harlem and began to build a strong movement of solidarity with 
Ethiopia. He set up first an organization known as the United Aid for Ethiopia and 
then, when this was taken over by the American Communist Party, the Ethiopian 
World Federation on 25 Augnst 1937. The main task of the Federation was to provide 
succour to Ethiopian refugees. By 1940, it could claim twenty-two branches, including 
some in Latin America and the West Indies. Malaku also published a newspaper, the 
Voice of Ethiopia .. Coming as it did after Marcus Garvey's deportation from the 
United States, Malaku's movement had the character of filling the vacuum created by 
that event. Indeed, in his speeches, Malaku combined identification with Ethiopa and 
black rhetoric, addressing his audience as "Fellow Ethiopians" and urging them to 
"think Black, act Black and be Black".73 But, although the Italian ambassador in 
Washington claimed that Malaku had raised the sum of US $100,000 in spring 1935,74 
his fund-raising campaign does not seem to have been very successful. According to 
Scott, rich Afro-Americans were not interested in the solidarity movement; and the poor 
ones, who were the most interested, were too much distressed themselves by the 
Depression to be able to render any assistance.75 Finally, presumably because of 
overwork, Malaku suffered a nervous breakdown in August 1939. He died on 4 May 
1940 of what was declared to be lobar pneumonia. 76 
As a sort of footnote to this section, one may note here the cases of two 
Ethiopians who saw resistance to Italian rule from an even broader internationalist, 
perspective than Malaku did. The first, whose name unfortunately remains 
unidentified, expressed his views in an article in an anti-Fascist weekly published by a 
certain Prof. Carlo Rosselli. He emphasized the common bonds that tied the Ethiopian 
Resistance and the Loyalist cause in Spain and depicted a post-Fascist scenario of Italo-
Ethiopian friendship: "Ethiopia has, to-day, not only a profound sympathy with the 
Spanish cause, which is easy to understand, and with the Italians now fighting in 
Spain; she must also, from this very day, prepare for active collaboration with the Italy 
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of to-morrow."77 The other Ethiopian, by the name of Gabra-Heywat, had been a 
student at Lausanne University in Switzerland. On the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian 
war, he returned to Ethiopia and fought under Ras Emeru. Following Ethiopia's 
military defeat, he joined the Spanish Loyalist forces against Fascism with the 
conviction "that to fight in Spain is tantamount to fighting for the independence of 
Ethiopia. "78 
Conclusions 
What conclusions can we draw from the above survey of the role of the 
intelligentsia in the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-41? The first, it seems to me, is that 
the intelligentsia showed greater perception of the threats to Ethiopian independence 
than the non-educated elite. Knowledge of the outside world, particularly of Europe, 
had brought in its wake a sobering awareness of Ethiopia's backwardness and the short 
lease of life that its independence had unless it modernized and put its house in order. 
These warnings ranged from the more general injunctions of Gabra-Egziabher Gila-
Maryam and Gabra-Heywat Baykadagn to the more practical-oriented recommendations 
of Tedla Haile and Takla-Hawaryat. Only Afawarq Gabra-Iyyasus among the 
intellectuals refused to see the danger; but this is not altogether surprising in light of his 
later career as ideologue of the Fascist occupation. 
The second point one can make is the rather obvious one that modem education 
did not automatically mean resistance to Italian rule. As was the case with the rest of 
Ethiopian society, there were collaborators just as there were patriots, although there 
appears to be no doubt that the patriots outnumbered the banda.. It would be 
reasonable to expect that frustration at Ethiopia's backwardness might have led 
members of the intelligentsia to espouse the colonial path of development. Some of the 
lines in Gabra-Heywat's writings, comparing independent Ethiopia unfavorably with 
British-ruled Sudan and Italian-ruled Eritrea, are almost suggestive of such an option. 
But there were in reality few intellectuals who were prepared to entertain the idea that 
Ethiopia should forfeit its independence for the sake of progress. Indeed, most of them 
readily identified with the Hayla-Sellase regime and exhibited pronounced nationalistic 
sentiments which Western observers were ready to label as xenophobic. Afawarq does 
laud the Fascist order for introducing the kind of changes he had advocated all along. 
But, in view of his total lack of principle and crass opportunism, it is difficult to give 
much credit to his arguments. 
Third, one can suggest tentatively that resistance to Italian rule appears to have 
been most intense among those with an Anglo-Saxon and Protestant educational 
background than among those of Latin and Catholic formation. Like all 




Lion leadership on the one hand and the collaboration of the Catholic intelligentsia led 
by Blatten Geta Walda-Maryam on the other clearly bears this out. On an individual 
level, the contrasting roles of the Anglo-Ethiopian Hakim Warqenah and the Italo-
Ethiopian Afawarq dramatizes the opposition. Related to this is the prominent role 
played by the Eritrean-educated elite in the course of the war. Most of these men 
tended to have a Swedish evangelical background, a situation which was later carried 
over to the Unionist movement as well. 
Finally, and most important for post-1941 Ethiopia, the war resulted in the 
marginalization or liquidation of the intelligentsia. The most dramatic aspect of this is 
of course the wholesale and vengeful massacre of the intelligentsia during the Graziani 
Massacre. But in many other less dramatic ways as well, the exciting intellectual 
climate of the pre-war period was followed by the drab atmosphere of the post-1941 
era. The old giants disappeared from the scene, and there were no new ones to replace 
them. Warqenah extended his stay in India after Liberation and his eventual return 
caused scarcely a ripple. Takla-Hawaryat prolonged his exile in Madagascar and, after 
his return in 1955/56, retired to the obscurity of a gentleman-farmer's life in Rima, 
Hararge.79 Afawarq spent years in miserable captivity in Jimma until he died, blind, in 
1947.so Dr. Alamawarq Bayyana, who miraculously survived the Graziani Massacre, 
had a brief spell as liaison officer between the British administration and the Ethiopian 
government after 1941. He soon came into conflict with the brothers Walda-Giyorgis 
and Makonnen Walda-Yohannes, the latter of whom was apparently abusing his post as 
custodian of enemy property. Alamawarq's violent death soon after the Liberation is 
thus seen as having been not purely accidental. 81 
Even Yoftahe, who had been very close to both the emperor and Walda-
Giyorgis during their exile, was not entirely happy with the situation that began to 
unfold after 1941. His literary allusions to the good times the banda were having in 
post-Liberation Ethiopia- "No one was ready to give a hand when the gesho (a plant 
used for preparing the traditional beer and mead) was being ground, but everyone came 
out of hiding when it was time to drink" - must have displeased the many who stood 
to gain from the new arrangement. In 1942, he was offered a job in the Ministry of 
Education as a zema expert, which he declined, and was then made vice-president of 
the Senate. Although he continued to write, he led a solitary life and grew 
progressively schizophrenic. With the usual penchant for the conspiratorial, some have 
suspected poisoning behind his sudden death in July 1947, a suspicion given a 
semblance of verisimilitude by the fact that he had died after taking an injection for 
79Germachaw Ms., 30-34. 
SOstella, "Un personaggio amletico," 601; Zeqargachaw, "Ya Naggadras Afawarq Gabra-Iyyasus," 
32, gives the date for Afawarq's death as 15 Maskaram 1939 EC, i.e. 25 September 1946. 
Stora! communication from Alo Sebhatu, who was working as head of the Criminal 
Investigation Department under Alamawarq. 
22 
recurrent malaria. But it seems likely that it was his prolonged illness that finally 
claimed his life. 82 
Yoftahe's tragic fate does not alter the overall picture, however, that the 
emperor was more comfortable with those members of the intelligentsia who had a 
fundamentally traditional educational formation with a slight modem veneer, more or 
less like himself, than with those who had a more sustained exposure to foreign 
education and life. Thus, no intellectual was as close to the emperor as Heruy. But his 
death while in exile eliminated him from the post-1941 scene. His place as the 
emperor's confidant seems to have been taken over by Walda-Giyorgis Walda-
Yohannes and Makonnen Habta-Wald, both basically in Heruy's mould. Surrounded 
by people who had no independent intellectual or political base, the emperor went ahead 
to forge post-1941 Ethiopia on his own terms. Initially, the prevalent atmosphere of 
consensus might have contributed to the successes achieved in the realms of economic 
growth and political integration. Ultimately, however, the absence of an even mildly 
critical spirit bred imperial complacency verging on arrogance which delivered Ethiopia 
to the tribulations of the 1960s and 1970s. 
82MuJugeta, "Ya Qagn Geta Yoftahe Neguse ya Heywat Taruc," 70-82. 
